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HOW JURORS DEAL WITH EXPERT 
TESTIMONY AND HOW JUDGES CAN HELP* 
Shari Seidman Diamond** 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Expert evidence is a familiar but challenging feature in the 
modern trial.1 Judges must decide on the admissibility of expert 
testimony,2 and jurors must grapple with the testimony if it is 
admitted. If courts are uneasy about the ability of the jury to 
handle the expert evidence, they may be inclined to play a more 
active role as gatekeeper in monitoring what the jury will be 
permitted to consider. Critics of the jury often assume that lay 
jurors are incapable of understanding and assessing the claims of 
                                                           
 * This article is based on my presentation at the Science for Judges IX 
conference at the Brooklyn Law School in April, 2007. I drew on research 
supported, in part, by research grants from the State Justice Institute (Grant SJI-
97-N-247), the National Science Foundation (Grant SBR9818806), and the 
American Bar Foundation, with additional support from Northwestern University 
Law School and Duke University Law School. For previously published work 
based on this research, see infra at notes 6, 11, 23, 27 and 29. Thanks to my 
collaborators, Mary R. Rose and Beth Murphy, for their comments on an earlier 
version of the draft. Thanks also to Professor Margaret Berger, Suzanne J. & 
Norman Miles Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and monitor of the 
Symposium, whose leadership at the interface of science and law has inspired 
and informed all of us.  
 ** Howard J. Trienens Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, 
Northwestern University Law School and Senior Research Fellow, American 
Bar Foundation. 
1 See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1114 
(1991). 
2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also 
FED. R. EVID. 702–703; Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 
(1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
DIAMOND FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/3/07 5:15 PM 
48 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
experts who present technical, scientific, or pseudo-scientific 
testimony.3 What may happen if jurors indeed cannot competently 
evaluate expert testimony? One possibility is that they will ignore 
crucial evidence.  An alternative possibility is that the jurors will be 
naively uncritical of expert testimony, overawed by an expert with 
imposing credentials, impressed by jargon they do not understand, 
and misled by “its aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.”4 
Neither of these threats comports with the picture of jury reactions 
to experts that emerges from empirical research on jury behavior.5 
That is not to say that juries always understand expert 
evidence. No layperson, juror, or judge faced with complex 
technical or scientific evidence can be expected to master all of this 
challenging material, so it is not surprising to find occasions on 
which the trier of fact reaches a decision that appears to be 
inconsistent with the weight of the evidence. Indeed, one of the 
advantages of appellate review is that it can provide some check on 
these errors. But before drawing any conclusions about deficiencies 
in how jurors deal with expert testimony, a more systematic 
analysis of the evidence is required. I begin with an overall picture 
of jury decision-making drawn from a variety of empirical studies. I 
then turn specifically to research addressing how jurors respond to 
expert testimony. Finally, I consider the particular challenges 
posed by experts and what judges can do to optimize how jurors 
deal with expert testimony. 
Throughout this analysis, I draw on several different 
approaches to the empirical study of jury behavior. Together these 
different ways of studying the jury provide a more grounded and 
comprehensive picture of juries than would be obtainable from one 
methodor from the selective newspaper coverage of unusual 
trials.6 The methods include archival studies of jury verdicts;7 post-
                                                           
3 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN 
THE COURTROOM (1991). 
4 United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973). 
5 Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1149–67 (2001). 
6 Shari Seidman Diamond, Truth, Justice, and the Jury, 26 HARV. J. OF 
LAW & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2003); Michael McCann et al., Java Jive: Genealogy 
of a Juridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113, 142 (2001); Laura Beth Nielsen 
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trial surveys of jurors;8 surveys of jury observers, such as judges 
and attorneys;9 simulations;10 and a unique study, the Arizona Jury 
Project, in which we were able to videotape and analyze actual civil 
jury deliberations.11 
Each of these sources has strengths and weaknesses. Archival 
studies can collect information on large samples of cases but 
depend on the information that courts or jury verdict reporters 
have collected. As a result, a significant amount of relevant 
information is often missing. Post-trial surveys and interviews with 
jurors enable researchers to reconstruct juror understandings and 
deliberations with input from the jurors themselves, but even 
cooperative jurors may provide incomplete and misleading 
impressions. Jurors who are questioned after trial know how the 
trial came out and have publicly endorsed the verdict. The outcome 
can have a powerful impact on the jurors, leading them in 
                                                           
& Aaron Beim, Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and Public 
Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237 
(2004); Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with 
the Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort 
Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 419 (1996). 
7 Gross, supra note 1. 
8 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & Valerie P. Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert 
Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
441, 450–452 (2003); Daniel W. Shuman & Anthony Champagne, Removing 
the People from the Legal Process: The Rhetoric and Research on Judicial 
Selection and Juries, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 242, 253–56 (1997). 
9 HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); 
Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its 
Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1994); Theodore 
Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial 
Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL. LEGAL 
STUDIES 171 (2005). 
10 Margaret B. Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: Effects 
of Juror Gender and Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work 
Environment Case, 84 J. APP. PSYCHOL. 362 (1999); Brian L. Cutler et al., 
Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis, 7 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 215 (1989). 
11 Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary R. Rose, Leslie Ellis, & 
Beth Murphy, Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona 
Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Juror Discussions During 
Civil Trials]. 
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retrospect to view the ultimate verdict as inevitable and affecting 
their recall of the process that produced the jury’s decision.12 
In jury simulationsthe method most frequently used to study 
jury behaviorit is possible to systematically test the impact of 
variations in evidence or procedure on jurors, thereby providing 
strong causal evidence on how these variations affect behavior. 
Mock jurors participating in simulations, however, even those 
simulations using members of the jury venire and presenting full-
length videotaped trials, know that they are in a simulation. In 
addition, both the trials and the jury deliberations in simulations are 
predictably short in duration.13 The extent to which these 
characteristics affect the behavior of mock jurors is likely to vary, 
depending on the nature of the case and the behavior being 
measured. 
Finally, one study of deliberating juries deciding actual cases 
provides for the first time a direct window into real jury 
deliberations, even though it too has a potential weakness: although 
the jurors were assured that, under court order, no one other than 
the researchers would ever view the deliberations, and the cameras 
were unobtrusively positioned in the ceilings, the jurors knew that 
their deliberations were being videotaped.14 While each of these 
methods thus has both strengths and weaknesses, the weaknesses 
vary across methods. Together, this large body of research shows a 
consistent pattern of results, both in describing jury behavior 
overall and in revealing how jurors react to experts.15 
                                                           
12 See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome 
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 288, 
288 (1975). 
13 For a discussion of the value and limitations of jury simulations, see 
Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows From Jury Simulations, 
21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561, 562 (1997). 
14 For a detailed description of the taping and consent procedures, see Juror 
Discussions During Civil Trials, supra note 11, at 23. 
15 See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 5, at 1174. 
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I.  THE JURY’S APPROACH TO THE TRIAL 
A jury is not a blank slate that merely absorbs trial evidence 
and instructions on the law before applying the law to the evidence 
in order to arrive at a verdict. Indeed, courts recognize that 
something more is afoot when they tell jurors to consider all of the 
evidence in the light of reason, common sense, and experience. 
Jurors consider all of the evidence in this manneras they 
mustwhen arriving at their decisions. All human decisionmakers 
(judges as well as jurors) find it necessary to draw on their prior 
experiences to make sense of what they see and hear. Those prior 
beliefs and expectations unavoidably filter and organize 
perceptions,16 often assisting and occasionally impairing reasonable 
inferences about the evidence. For example, a juror in one of the 
cases in the Arizona Jury Project submitted a question during trial 
asking whether the fact that a young man had been drinking prior to 
being injured in a serious accident was likely to have affected the 
severity of his injury.17 This juror was implicitly drawing on his 
beliefs about the effects of alcohol, and perhaps his prior 
experiences with drinking.18 The ubiquitous impact of prior 
experience on judgment was reflected in an insightful observation 
from United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens in a 
recent interview.19 Justice Stevens said that he was sure that his 
views on the Supreme Court had been influenced by the “totally 
unjust conviction” of his father for embezzlement.20 
                                                           
16 Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross, & Mark R. Lepper. Biased Assimilation and 
Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently 
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 2098 (1979). 
17 The Project is described in Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, 
supra note 11, and discussed further infra text accompanying notes 28–33. 
18 In Arizona, where jurors are permitted to submit questions for witnesses 
during trial, a juror posed this question for the defense expert. The expert 
responded that the plaintiff’s drinking would have had no effect. It was a 
particularly credible response because a different answer might have assisted the 
defense. The issue was never mentioned during deliberations. 
19 Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 23, 2007, at 
50, 54. 
20 Id. 
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Research on jurors indicates that they typically are strongly 
motivated to reach a correct verdict, and that they actively process 
what they see and hear in the courtroom to arrive at that decision.21 
Jurors apply commonsense norms of behavior to evaluate the 
reasonableness of behavior and to sort out competing claims.22 
They are also aware that they are in an adversary setting, that all of 
the witnesses and attorneys are attempting to persuade them, and 
that it will be up to the jurors to decide which of the conflicting 
accounts is convincing. As a result, jurors are alert to signs that 
witnesses are dissembling, and they “cross-check” claims, seeking 
consistency across sources.23 Jurors are particularly interested in 
evidence that appears to be less subject to manipulation and more 
reliable than the claims of an interested party or other witness. As 
the jurors watch the trial unfold, they also realize that at the trial’s 
conclusion they will have to reach a group decision which may 
involve convincing fellow jurors who have different reactions to the 
evidence. Although individuals tend to expect others to see the 
world the way they see it,24 the anticipation of having to defend 
one’s views and persuade others tends to promote active 
                                                           
21 See generally W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, 
RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM (1981); Nancy Pennington & 
Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1991); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, 
Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 
62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); Shari Seidman Diamond & 
Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, 
Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (1992). 
22 NORMAN FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JUROR’S NOTIONS OF THE 
LAW (1995); see also Jason Schklar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror 
Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 159, 180–81 (1999). 
23 Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, Beth Murphy & Sven Smith, 
Juror Questions During Trial: A Window Into Juror Thinking, 59 
VANDERBILT L. REV. 1927, 1954–62 (2006) [hereinafter Juror Questions 
During Trial]. 
24 Lee Ross, David Greene, & Pamela House, The “False Consensus 
Effect”: An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 
J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCHOL. 279 (1977); Joachim Krueger & Russell W. 
Clement, The Truly False Consensus Effect: An Ineradicable and Egocentric 
Bias in Social Perception, 67 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCH. 596 (1994). 
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engagement and processing.25 
This engagement by jurors does not eliminate their need to 
struggle with some of the judgments they are asked to make and the 
tools (e.g., jury instructions) they are expected to use in reaching 
those judgments. Jury interactions during deliberations generally do 
not represent a linear decision-making process, yet by the end of 
deliberations, this group process generally results in a verdict that 
most jurors see as fairly reflecting the facts that led to the trial and 
comporting with the law as they understand it. 
II.  JUROR RESPONSE TO EXPERTS 
Complex evidence presents a particular challenge for both the 
experts who must communicate with a lay audience and the 
audience members themselvesthe triers of fact. Jurors recognize 
the value of expert evidence for assisting them in reaching their 
decisions, but surveys of jurors indicate that while jurors find 
expert testimony to be useful, they are also wary of experts. For 
example, in one survey of jurors, 30 percent said, “experts 
provided biased testimony.”26 Other studies have shown that 
jurors expect experts to be relatively competent and likely to be 
knowledgeable, but jurors also anticipate that the experts will be 
influenced by the side that called them to testify.27 Thus, 
countervailing forces influence juror perceptions of expert 
testimony because the credibility of a communicator is influenced 
by the communicator’s expertise and trustworthiness. The 
expectation of potential bias acts as a brake on the persuasiveness 
of an expert.28 
                                                           
25 Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental 
Attribution Error, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 227, 233 (1985). 
26 Daniel W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony Champagne, An 
Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: 
A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 203 (1994). 
27 Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of 
the Jury, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 746 (2006). 
28 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the 
Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 513, 558 (1992). 
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The Arizona Jury Project, in which we observed actual jury 
deliberations, presented a unique opportunity to observe how 
juries handle expert testimony.29 The opportunity to study these 
jury deliberations arose because an innovative group of judges and 
attorneys in Arizona, encouraged by the Arizona Supreme Court, 
took a close look at their jury system. As a result, Arizona decided 
to make some changes aimed at facilitating jury performance, 
including a controversial innovation instructing jurors that they 
were permitted to discuss the case among themselves during breaks 
in the trial. To evaluate the effect of allowing discussions, the 
Arizona Supreme Court issued an order permitting a team of 
researchers to conduct a randomized experiment in which some 
jurors in some cases were instructed that they could discuss the 
case and others were given the traditional admonition not to discuss 
the case.30 The court order also permitted us to videotape the jury 
discussions and deliberations.31 
The jurors, attorneys, and parties were promised that the tapes 
would be viewed only by the researchers and only for research 
purposes. Jurors were told about the videotaping project when 
they arrived at court for their jury service. If they preferred not to 
participate, they were assigned to cases not involved in the project. 
                                                           
29 See Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, supra, note 11. Other 
published articles drawing on data from the Arizona Project include: Shari 
Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden 
Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001); Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, 
Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis, & Beth Murphy, Inside the Jury Room: Evaluating 
Juror Discussions During Trial, 87 JUDICATURE 54 (2003); Diamond, supra 
note 6; Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose, & Beth Murphy, Jurors’ 
Unanswered Questions, 41 CT. REV. 20 (2004); Shari Seidman Diamond, 
Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revising the Unanimity Requirement: The 
Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2006); 
Juror Questions During Trial, supra note 23. 
30 See Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, supra note 11. 
31 See id. at 17, for a detailed report on the permissions and security 
measures the project required, and the results of the evaluation. As part of their 
obligations of confidentiality under the Supreme Court Order as well as 
additional assurances to parties and jurors undertaken by the principal 
investigators, the Authors of this Article have changed certain details to disguise 
individual cases. The changes do not, however, affect the substantive nature of 
the findings that are reported. 
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The juror participation rate was over 95 percent.32 Attorneys and 
litigants were less willing to take part in the study. Some attorneys 
were generally willing to participate when they had a case before 
one of the participating judges; others consistently refused. The 
result was a 22 percent yield among otherwise eligible trials. 
We also videotaped the trials themselves and collected the 
exhibits, juror questions submitted during trial, jury instructions, 
and verdict forms. In addition, the jurors, attorneys, and judge 
completed questionnaires at the end of the trial. The fifty cases in 
the study reflected the usual mix of cases dealt with by state 
courts: 26 motor vehicle cases (52 percent), four medical 
malpractice cases (8 percent), seventeen other tort cases (34 
percent), and three contract cases (6 percent).33 Awards ranged 
from $1,000 to $2.8 million, with a median award of $25,500. 
In the prior analysis of the discussion innovation, we looked 
for indicators of how the opportunity for discussion affected 
jurors’ response to expert testimony. The opportunity to discuss 
the case appeared to be particularly helpful in the more complex 
cases. When factual questions arose about the evidence, discussion 
tended to improve the accuracy of recall. Moreover, jurors 
permitted to discuss the case reported significantly greater ease in 
comprehension of the expert testimony.34 Thus, the opportunity 
to discuss the case appeared to provide assistance precisely where 
advocates of the innovation expected it would be most valuable. 
After completing our evaluation of the impact of the 
discussions innovation on the Arizona juries, we turned to analyses 
of the deliberations from this unique data set to answer other 
questions about the jury. Some of these analyses provide insights 
                                                           
32 Although we cannot be certain that the cameras had no effect on their 
behavior during deliberations, the behavior during deliberations at times 
included comments that the jurors presumably would not have wanted the 
judges or attorneys to hear. 
33 This distribution is similar to the breakdown for civil jury trials for the 
Pima Country Superior Court for the year 2001: 62 percent motor vehicle tort 
cases, 8 percent medical malpractice cases, 23 percent other tort cases and 6 
percent contract cases (figures provided by Nicole M. Waters of the National 
Center for State Courts). 
34 Juror Discussions During Civil Trials, supra note 11, at 74–76. 
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into how jurors respond to expert testimony. Forty-three of the 
fifty cases had experts who gave live testimony, a median of three 
per case. Half of the cases (24 of the 50) had opposing experts who 
testified on the same issue. The 122 live expert witnesses included 
physicians, mental health professionals, biomechanical engineers, 
financial analysts, and academic scientists. The jurors in these cases 
had an opportunity to submit questions for these experts during 
trial. In Arizona, as in a small but growing number of jurisdictions, 
jurors are permitted to submit questions for witnesses during 
trial.35 The 257 questions the jurors submitted for experts revealed 
what jurors were thinking about as they were being exposed to 
expert testimony,36 and their deliberations provide some insights 
into juror reactions to the experts. 
Research on cognitive processing distinguishes between two 
reactions to attempts at persuasion.37 The first is peripheral or 
heuristic processing which occurs when decision makers are either 
unmotivated or unable to evaluate the arguments that a 
communicator is making. Under those circumstances, the decision 
maker is inclined to use a short cuta heuristicto decide whether 
or not to accept the claims being made. The prestige of the 
communicator, e.g., her occupation or education, provides a 
peripheral cue to the decision maker that, all other things being 
equal, he should accept the claims that the expert is making. If 
jurors were motivated to avoid the effort of evaluating expert 
evidence, or if they simply were unable to process the information 
                                                           
35 A few states, including Arizona, now require judges to tell jurors that 
they may submit questions during trial. Most leave the choice to judicial 
discretion, although a few explicitly forbid it. The 2005 ABA Principles for 
Juries and Jury Trials endorses the practice. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS, PRINCIPLE 13(C). 
36 This section is based in part on Juror Questions During Trial, supra 
note 23, focusing on the 257 questions jurors submitted for experts out of the 
829 total questions they submitted for all witnesses. 
37 ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
ATTITUDES 326–27 (1993); Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic Model of 
Persuasion, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 3 (Mark P. 
Zanna et al. eds., 1987); RICHARD E. PETTY, COMMUNICATION AND 
PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 3 
(John T. Cacioppo ed., 1986). 
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an expert was offering, they could simply defer and accept the 
conclusions without engaging in further processing. Jurors would 
be engaged in peripheral processing if they merely compared the 
credentials of two opposing experts and accepted the opinions of 
the more prestigious source. 
A second form of processing, called central or systematic 
processing, occurs when a decision maker is motivated to 
understand and evaluate a persuasive communication, scrutinizing 
the quality of the arguments and not simply deferring to the claims 
of a prestigious source.38 The questions jurors submitted to the 
experts reveal how jurors attempted to deal with expert testimony 
as it was being presented during trial. 
The clearest evidence of peripheral processing would emerge if 
jurors failed to submit questions to the expert witnesses at all or if 
they asked only about credentials or experience. In fact, jurors 
submitted questions for almost half (47.5 percent) of the expert 
witnesses, averaging 2.11 questions per witness. Even though 
jurors are instructed that they should consider the qualifications 
and experience of expert witnesses in judging their credibility,39 
only fifteen (5.8 percent) of the 257 questions directed to the 
experts concerned credentials or experience. Instead, the nature of 
the questions generally reflected attempts by the jurors to get 
further information that could assist them in evaluating the content 
of the testimony. Many of the questions focused on alternative 
                                                           
38 Chaiken, supra note 37, at 3; see generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. 
Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1131 (1993). 
39 ARIZONA STATE BAR, REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 6, 
7 (3d ed. 1997)  
A witness qualified as an expert by education or experience may state 
opinions on matters in that witness’s field of expertise, and may also 
state reasons for those opinions. Expert opinion testimony should be 
judged just as any other testimony. You are not bound by it. You may 
accept it or reject it, in whole or in part, and you should give it as 
much weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness’s 
qualifications and experience, the reasons given for the opinions, and all 
the other evidence in the case. 
Id. 
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possible causes for the plaintiff’s injury. 
Although overall, issues of causation were the focus of 21.1 
percent of the juror questions, they accounted for 34.6 percent of 
the questions for experts. For example, in a medical malpractice 
case a juror asked: “What were other potential causes for the . . . 
damage that you observed and why were they less plausible causes 
for [the plaintiff’s injury] than the cause that you have 
ascertained?” Other questions simply sought clarification on what 
the witness had said. For example, in one case involving a claim of 
infliction of emotional distress, a juror asked the psychologist, 
“What does the term ‘reasonable psychological probability’ 
mean?” In some of the questions, jurors probed the basis for the 
expert’s conclusions. In a motor vehicle case, a juror asked the 
engineer who testified about his description of what must have 
happened to the passenger at the time of impact, “Not knowing 
how he was sitting, or his weight, how can you be sure he hit his 
shoulder?” In a products liability case, the jurors questioned a 
scientist on his methods for testing and evaluating the product. 
And in several cases, experts testified about standards of 
reasonable care and jurors submitted questions asking whether 
specific governmental or industry regulations applied and, if so, 
what the codes or regulations said. In sum, the questions as a group 
reflect a picture consistent with central rather than peripheral 
processing. In some cases, the expert testimony did not turn out to 
be pertinent for the jurors in reaching their verdicts (e.g., when a 
physician testified about the extent of a plaintiff’s injury and the 
jury concluded that the defendant had not been negligent), but in 
other cases the jurors discussed the content of the expert testimony 
extensively during deliberations. 
Examples from the deliberations reveal some of the cues jurors 
used to evaluate the trustworthiness of the expert testimony.40 
Jurors were suspicious of experts who appeared to be obfuscating. 
As one juror complained, “He won’t give you a straight answer.” 
They also occasionally expressed concern that an expert’s opinion 
was unrepresentative. For example, in a medical malpractice case in 
                                                           
40 We will present a comprehensive analysis of the role played by expert 
testimony in these deliberations in a future article. 
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which opposing experts made opposing claims about the 
reasonable standard of care, a juror expressed concern about the 
difficulty of evaluating which was more accurate: “What I would 
like to have is 40 [specialists] and show them the [test results] and 
okay, get a survey and is this significant or is this not significant 
and would they have [done what the defendant did]?” 
We asked the judges to indicate on their post-trial 
questionnaires the names of any witnesses who were “particularly 
important or crucial” on the issue of liability for the plaintiff’s case 
and for the defendant’s case. In five of the cases the judges named 
two expert witnesses in the same general field (e.g., medicine, 
engineering) who gave opposing testimony on the same liability 
issue. In these five cases, the evidence presented by the experts 
was clearly contested and, in the judge’s opinion, central to the 
case. I examined the trial evidence and jury deliberations in these 
cases to get an overall picture of the extent to which the juries dealt 
with the testimony given by these experts, and how they 
attempted to resolve the differences between them. During their 
deliberations, the jurors discussed the testimony of all of these 
witnesses, although they did not discuss the testimony of each 
expert in detail in each case: 
Case 1: The principal dispute between the experts 
concerned the need for surgery to relieve pain following an 
accident. The medical issue was whether the surgery was 
actually done in response to a preexisting injury or 
degenerative condition. The defense claimed that the 
accident had not caused any injury, and that surgery was 
unwarranted. The jurors spent much of their time analyzing 
the circumstances of the accident in light of the testimony 
of lay witnesses who were on the scene, concluding that the 
accident had caused some injury. Nonetheless, the jurors 
were doubtful about the credibility of the plaintiff who 
appeared to give inconsistent testimony about his injuries. 
In discussing the competing medical testimony, the jurors 
consulted the MRI results as well as the expert testimony 
about the alleged injury. Several jurors expressed 
disapproval in response to the defense attorney’s argument 
that the plaintiff’s expert, a “doctor that teaches at a 
DIAMOND FINAL DRAFT AUTHORIZED.DOC 12/3/07 5:15 PM 
60 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
university,” was offering junk science and was not being 
reputable. Nonetheless, the jurors were persuaded that the 
plaintiff was exaggerating his pain, as the defense expert 
suggested. The jurors concluded that the plaintiff would 
have been better off “if [defense expert] had been his doctor 
from the beginning.” 
Case 2: In a medical malpractice case, the opposing experts 
disagreed on whether the defendant met the relevant 
standard of care, the diagnosis, and the causal impact of the 
defendant’s behavior. Both experts were well-credentialed 
and experienced. The jurors viewed both of them as good 
teachers, although they found the defense expert somewhat 
longwinded. They were also impressed by the experts’ 
credentials (“Have you seen the credentials on this doctor? 
Have you read his resume? It’s the size of a small book.”) 
But they viewed with some cynicism what they perceived 
as the attempt to impress them with it (“That’s part of the 
reason why they gave that to us to read.”). There were 
many other witnesses in the case, but the jurors spent the 
bulk of their time during deliberations discussing the 
content of the testimony from these opposing experts, 
comparing what they said on all three of the relevant 
contested issues they covered. The jurors in the end were 
persuaded that the outcome would probably have been 
different if the defendant had treated the patient according 
to what they were convinced was reasonable care. 
Case 3: The plaintiffs in this case claimed they had suffered 
emotional trauma due to a serious injury the defendant had 
caused. The opposing experts offered testimony on the 
evidence for the emotional distress and its probable cause. 
The defense expert claimed that other conflict in the family 
and prior events could explain the emotional trauma 
allegedly experienced by one of the plaintiffs. The jurors 
spent little time discussing the expert testimony, although 
they discussed the likely causes of the plaintiff’s emotional 
disturbance. Unlike the other expert testimony that 
appeared technical or scientific on its face, the jurors did 
not struggle to work through the meaning of the clinical 
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testimony on mental health. They appeared comfortable in 
drawing conclusions about the alleged trauma based on their 
own experience. The jurors were also inclined to discount 
the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert who they viewed as 
arrogant. Although they also specifically rejected his 
analysis of the extent of the plaintiff’s psychological injury 
as overblown and only partially agreed with his causal 
account of its source, they ultimately arrived at a modest 
damage award on this claim. 
Case 4: The plaintiff hired the defendant to repair her 
furnace. The defendant repaired the furnace, but informed 
the plaintiff that she needed to replace it due to its age. The 
plaintiff adjusted some wiring next to the furnace after the 
defendant completed the repair. When the furnace caught 
fire a short time later, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
was responsible. The opposing experts testified on the 
likely cause of the fire, and much of the deliberation focused 
on that testimony, as the jurors struggled to make sense of 
the competing paths that might have led to the fire. 
Ultimately, the jurors were not convinced that the 
repairman had been careless or negligent, and they were 
unpersuaded that the plaintiff had shown that the causal 
mechanism the expert identified was the cause of the fire. 
Several jurors concluded that the weight of the evidence was 
evenly balanced, so the defendant should prevail. 
Case 5: The opposing experts the judge identified as 
important in this automobile collision were both engineers 
who offered testimony on how the accident had occurred, 
including its physical impact on the plaintiff. Liability for 
minor injury to the plaintiff was not in dispute, but the 
point of impact and liability for the major injury the 
plaintiff claimed he had sustained, were hotly contested. 
The plaintiff’s expert had more education (a Ph.D), while 
the defense expert had more experience as a consultant in 
accident reconstruction. The jurors explored this difference, 
but ultimately concluded that it was not significant and 
focused their attention on the content of the testimony. 
Much of their discussion of these experts occurred during 
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breaks in the trial.41 During the deliberations, the jury 
focused on both the medical testimony and the impact 
analyses. The jurors concluded that the defense medical 
expert was correct when he testified that all, or at least part, 
of the plaintiff’s medical condition had been caused by a 
pre-existing injury, rather than by damage resulting from the 
collision. The jury also discussed how the plaintiff’s failure 
to wear his seatbelt had contributed to the injury. 
Many of the themes reflected in the jurors’ questions for 
experts and in these deliberations mirror patterns we have observed 
in other research on juries: the jurors do not accept expert 
testimony on face value. They consider credentials and expertise, 
but are actively engaged with the content and attempt to assess the 
accuracy of what the experts say. Although the jurors vary in their 
understanding of the evidence, jurors who appear to have greater 
mastery of the evidence assist the others and tend to be most 
influential. Thus, juries draw on the expertise of their most 
competent member to assess the strength of the evidence.42 
Nonetheless, although jurors typically work diligently and 
ordinarily succeed as a group in understanding the major elements 
of the expert testimony, they are sometimes confused by what 
experts say.43 Jurors are instructed to base their verdicts on the 
evidence and legal instructions, but their ability to fully process the 
evidence may be reduced if the expert fails to teach as well as to 
attempt to persuade. Even when this occurs, jurors generally are 
not overwhelmed and misled by the complexity of expert evidence. 
Instead, they use reasonable strategies to evaluate it44 When faced 
                                                           
41 The jury in this case was told that jury members were permitted to 
discuss the evidence during breaks. 
42 See Diamond & Casper, supra note 28. 
43 MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PICUS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY 
PERFORMANCE 27–28 (1987). See generally Joseph Sanders, Jury Deliberation 
in a Complex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45 
(1993). 
44 See Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock 
After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181 
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Irwin Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An 
Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 
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with technical testimony, jurors look for cues about the 
trustworthiness of the source, sometimes using the language itself 
as a cue. They do use credentials and experience as cues, but not in 
the absence of an evaluation of the message itself. That is, there is 
little evidence to suggest that jurors adopt the position of an expert 
based solely on peripheral cues.45 What is more likely to happen is 
that the juror will reject unintelligible expert testimonya pattern 
that should create an incentive for experts (and for the attorneys 
who hire them) to maximize the clarity of the expert’s 
presentation. 
When jurors do understand the expert’s testimony, impressive 
credentials and technical language may boost the influence of an 
expert.46 When the expert’s lack of clarity prevents jurors from 
understanding the testimony, the expert is less likely to 
successfully persuade the jurors.47 This pattern is consistent with 
the literature on persuasion which indicates that use of obscure and 
unusual words generally reduces persuasiveness48 and with models 
of attitude change that emphasize reception as a precondition to 
yielding.49 Jurors may give less credence to an expert who uses 
jargon if the jurors interpret it as obfuscation or if the expert 
displays other evidence of potential bias such as an unusually high 
rate of pay.50 
The jury has one advantage over judges when dealing with 
expert evidence. Neither judge nor jury is likely to be an expert on 
                                                           
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 284 (1990); Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 5 at 
1143. 
45 See sources cited supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
46 See Joel Cooper, Elizabeth A. Bennett, & Holly L. Sukel, Complex 
Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 379, 382 (1996). 
47 See Diamond & Casper, supra note 21, at 542, 543. 
48 See generally John Waite Bowers, Language Intensity, Social 
Introversion, and Attitude Change, 30 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 345 (1963). 
49 See William J. McGuire, Attitude Change: The Information Processing 
Paradigm, in EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 108 (Charles Graham 
McClintock ed., 1972). 
50 See Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The “Hired Gun” Effect: 
Assessing the Effect of Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the 
Perception of Expert Testimony, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 150–51 (2000). 
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the technical substantive content that an expert may offer, but the 
jury is more likely to have at least one member who has a 
substantive technical background or some training in science. How 
jurors should use this quasi-expertise in the jury room is the 
subject of some debate,51 but there is no doubt that jurors do draw 
on their experience, whether such experience is technical, scientific, 
or otherwise, when responding to the evidence at trial. Although 
there is no evidence that complexity induces a greater rate of 
disagreement between judges and juries on the appropriate 
verdict,52 complexity nonetheless presents a general and 
unavoidable challenge to legal decision-making that is not unique to 
jury trials. 
III.  WHAT JUDGES CAN DO 
A judge who is motivated to optimize how juries handle expert 
testimony has a number of tools available. As most studies of the 
jury show, when jurors enter the courtroom, they are interested in 
learning and eager to reach a correct decision. Judges can facilitate 
the learning process. In 1993, Judge Michael Dann provided a 
blueprint for how to optimize juror understanding when he offered 
an education model that included innovations such as allowing juror 
note-taking, permitting juror questions during trial, and instructing 
the jury on the relevant law before the trial begins.53 
Some courts have adopted these procedures, but the changes 
have been slow and the old ways persist.54 As we have learned 
from the Arizona Jury Project, permitting jurors to submit 
questions for witnesses reveals that the jurors have substantive 
questions for the experts that can be answered promptly and can 
                                                           
51 See, e.g., People v. Maragh, 729 N.E.2d 701 (N.Y. 2000). 
52 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 9, at 56; see also Heuer & Penrod, supra 
note 9, at 49; Eisenberg et al., supra note 9, at 171–72. 
53 B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: 
Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1251–53 (1993). 
54 For a summary of current patterns in federal and state courts, see National 
Center for State Courts, The State-of-the-States Survey of Jury Improvement 
Efforts Executive Summary, www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/cjs/pdf/sos_exec_ 
sum.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
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dispel some sources of confusion when they arise.55 Other research 
has shown that note-taking improves recall and understanding,56 
and providing mock jurors with summaries of expert reports before 
the experts testify can facilitate juror understanding of the 
testimony.57 If the aim is an informed decision maker, whose 
common sense judgments are not sabotaged by technical obstacles, 
the judge and attorneys can provide trial notebooks with glossaries 
and interim statements in order to offer further assistance in a 
complex expert-laden trial. 
Another promising potential tool that has not yet been the 
subject of systematic study but is worth consideration is the 
scheduling of back-to-back experts. To facilitate ease in comparing 
the testimony of opposing experts who would otherwise testify 
days or even weeks apart, it may be worth adjusting the typical 
trial order to permit the experts to testify back-to-back. If this 
innovation is introduced, the judge should explain how and why 
this is being done (e.g., “to make it easier for you to understand the 
parties’ evidence on these complex issues”). The advantage of the 
judge’s explanation at this point is that it informs the jury how to 
deal with the change in the order of the evidence and also alerts the 
jurors to the fact that the evidence they will be hearing is likely to 
be strongly contested. 
After the Science for Judges IX Conference held at Brooklyn 
Law School in April, 2007, Judge Jack Weinstein asked for 
suggestions on “any special instructions that should be given jurors 
in a case that turns on scientific evidence about how to handle the 
evidence.”58 My own sense from studying juror efforts to use 
                                                           
55 Juror Questions During Trial,  supra note 23. 
56 David L. Rosenhan, Sara L. Eisner & Robert J. Robinson, Notetaking 
Can Aid Juror Recall, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 59 (1994); Irwin A. 
Horowitz & Lynne ForsterLee, The Effects of Note-Taking and Trial Transcript 
Access on Mock Jury Decisions in a Complex Civil Trial, 25 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 373, 382–89 (2001). 
57 Lynne ForsterLee, Irwin Horowitz, Elizabeth Athaide-Victor, & Nicole 
Brown, The Bottom Line: The Effect of Written Expert Witness Statements on 
Juror Verdicts and Information Processing, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 259 
(2000). 
58 E-mail from Margaret Berger, Suzanne J. & Norman Miles Professor of 
Law, Brooklyn Law School to Shari Seidman Diamond, Howard J. Trienens 
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expert testimony appropriately is that the typical jury instruction 
that a judge delivers at the end of the trial comes too late. A better 
approach to focus and assist jurors would involve an earlier 
intervention: an instruction just before an expert testifies noting 
that the complexity of some expert testimony poses a special 
challenge, and the jurors may find it useful to submit questions for 
the expert at the end of the expert’s testimony. 
Explicit judicial acknowledgement of the complexity of expert 
testimony, coupled with an indication from the judge that juror 
questions would be appropriate at the conclusion of the witness’s 
testimony, would serve a dual purpose. First, it would signal to the 
jurors that the witness will be delivering important and potentially 
difficult information. Second, it would convey the message that it is 
acceptable for a juror to ask what might appear to be a “dumb” 
question. Although there is no reason to permit jurors to submit 
questions only for expert witnesses, this special instruction on 
submitting questions for experts could occur whether or not juror 
questions are permitted for other witnesses.59 
The easiest path for judges to take in conducting jury trials is to 
avoid any unnecessary communication with the jury during the 
trial, to follow traditional orders and procedures, and to depend 
solely on the efforts of the parties to enable the jurors to 
understand the evidence. Adopting this passive judicial model 
avoids criticism; moreover, attorneys may prefer judges to stay in 
the background as much as possible during trial. It does make some 
sense to be cautious because jurors are aware of the alignment of 
witnesses and attorneys, and, viewing the judge as a more 
trustworthy source of information, jurors may look for cues from 
the judge.60 As one of the Arizona Jury Study deliberations made 
                                                           
Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Northwestern University School 
of Law (April 27, 2007, 11:49 EST) (on file with author) (Judge Weinstein’s 
question was conveyed by Professor Berger in an E-mail to Shari Seidman 
Diamond and Valerie Hans).  
59 Warren D. Wolfson, An Experiment in Juror Interrogation of Witnesses, 
12 CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 1, 12, 13 (1987). 
60 Peter David Blanck & LaDoris Hazzard Cordell, The Appearance of 
Justice: Judges’ Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985). 
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clear, the judge is never invisible: 
Juror #1: I’ve got to say, the judge is really good at keeping 
a poker face. (Several other jurors: Yeah) Because I mean 
through all that testimony, through the little heated debates 
that go on. The attorneys sure seemed to get upset a couple 
of times or acted like they were. 
Juror #4: You’ve got to have an opinion on something. 
Juror #1: I know! I looked at him the whole time, and he 
never. . . 
Juror #6: [interrupting] So did I! 
Juror #1: [continuing] Well, not the whole time, but he 
never made a face. I never got the feeling that he thought 
one thing or another. And that’s a skill. 
Juror #5: Yeah. 
 
None of the procedures suggested here, many of them currently 
used in the Arizona Jury Study courtroom that produced this juror 
exchange, alter the impartial position of the judge in this example. 
All are neutral ways to reduce unnecessary juror confusion. The 
judge who uses these methods thus can serve all of the trial 
participantsparties, jurors, and expertswithout favoring, or 
appearing to favor, any one of them. 
 
